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Abstract 
Abstract: The Chinese economy has been significantly affected by the financial crisis. Moreover, a rapid decline in 
growth rate can be mainly attributed to the expenditure structural unbalance, which takes root in its uneven national 
income distribution. Furthermore, the uneven national income distribution is the result of the extensive pattern of 
China’s economic growth in the open economy. The extensive pattern is characterized by labor-intensive export-led 
growth model. The need for high growth rate and fiscal revenue maximization forces local governments to compete 
against each other to get FDI by undervaluing production factors, resulting in the extensive pattern of growth. From 
an institutional point of view, uneven social power between government and public, central government and local 
government, capital owners and labor force, and so on, can be viewed as the main reason for the extensive pattern of 
growth and uneven national income distribution. Low wages, which has been the main factor for the comparative 
advantage, now turns out to be barriers to boosting domestic demand. The Technology lag in the manufacturing 
industry also has a significant negative impact on improving labor productivity and increasing per capita income. 
Hence, to deal with the recession, not only quantitative easing, but also structural adjustments are needed. 
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1. Introduction 
From the short-term perspective, a rapid decline in the world market demand which was caused by the 
global financial crisis contributed to the Chinese economic slump from the late of 2008. However, the root 
cause for the Chinese economy to slow down rapidly when encountering a weak external demand is its 
economic unbalance in terms of expenditure structure. Hence, to deal with the recession, not only 
quantitative easing, but also structural adjustments are needed. At present, the Chinese government should 
pay more attention to economic structural adjustments after the economic slow-down has been alleviated 
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by the expansionary policy. 
China’s domestic expenditure has been characterized by high investment, high export and low 
consumption, which is closely related to its uneven national income distribution in which the labor share 
is decreasing. Furthermore, the latter is a result of the extensive growth model that China has adopted 
after its opening-up and economic reforms since 1978 but failed to change in time. The first priority of 
GDP growth rate and fiscal revenue maximization for local governments is the motivation of maintaining 
the extensive growth model in China. In order to do it, local governments have to pursue investment 
opportunities including FDI with low labor costs, low land costs, and low capital costs regardless of 
environment costs. Given the current comparative advantage, labor-intensive and export-led 
manufacturing became an economic growth engine.  As a result, the labor income has been growing 
slower than GDP, thereby consumption share has been declining.  
In this paper, we first investigate the factors leading to China’s economic structural imbalance from the 
perspective of the productive side; then, we discuss the distributional reasons for the expenditure 
structural unbalance; finally, we focus on the reform of growth model and the structural adjustments with 
emphasis on the reconfiguration of even social power. 
2. Economic Structural Imbalance and Economic Growth Model 
China’s economy has experienced phenomenal growth over the past 30 years. At the same time, the 
share of final consumption expenditure in GDP has been a downward trend, which reflecting serious 
imbalance of China’s economic structure (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: China’s GDP by Expenditure Approach 
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Source: The Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
The last decade saw the evolution of various components of demand as a proportion of GDP: final 
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consumption kept falling down, investment has remained at around 42 percent, and the share of net 
exports has risen dramatically from 2.5 percent in 2000 to 8.9 percent in 2007. As a result, China’s 
national expenditure structure is characterized by high investment, high export, and low consumption, in 
short, “Two High and One Low”. In 2007, the net export to GDP ratio reached 8.9 percent, which implied 
that the Chinese people in fact consumed only 90 percent of GDP in that year, and the left 10 percent of 
GDP loaned to the other countries in terms of net export. For the period of 2000-2008, the share of 
investment in GDP rose by 8.2 percentage points, and the net-export share of GDP fell by 5.5 percentage 
points, while the final consumption share of GDP fell by 13.7 percentage points with the ratio having 
decreasing by an annual average  of 1.7 percentage points. A decline in household consumption was the 
main reason for the trend. In 2008, the household consumption accounted for 35.3 percent in GDP, a 
decline of 11.1 percentage points over 2000. The government spending share of GDP amounted to 13.3 
percent, down by 2.6 percentage points over 2000. Although the government-spending-to-GDP share was 
declined, its share in the final consumption expenditure was up. The last decade saw a change in the 
structure of composition of China’s final consumption expenditure. In 1998, the ratio of household 
consumption to government spending was 3.17:1, while decreased to 2.66:1 in 2008. Because of the 
weakness of the final consumption, especially the household consumption, China’s high growth has been 
export-and-investment-driven over the last decade. 
Compared to the other economies which have the similar per capita gross GDP with China, the level of 
consumption share in China is very low.ii
As the Japanese economy began to slow down after the two oil crises, the investment share remained at 
the level of about 40 percent. Meanwhile, the household consumption share stopped falling and stayed at 
around 50 percent. In the 1990s, the investment share fell to 37.8 percent in 1997 from 41.2 percent 
in1990 after the bursting of bubble economy; a small increase in consumption share was observed though 
there was a rapid decline in the growth rate of Japan’s per capita real GDP. Since the Asian Financial 
Crisis, Japan’s expansionary stimulation policies failed to raise its economic growth rate; the investment 
share of GDP continues its downward trend, and the consumption share of GDP remains as large as 52 
percent. 
 Japan and South Korea have adopted the similar labor-intensive 
export-led growth model nearly since half a century ago. Figure 2 depicts the growth rate of the Japanese 
economy and shares of consumption-output and investment-output during 1960-2004. For the period of 
the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese economy has experienced high growth. At the same time, the share of 
consumption in GDP decreased to 48.3 percent in 1970 from 59.6 percent in 1960, while the share of 
investment in GDP increased to 42.7 percent in 1970 from 27.9 percent in 1960. 
 
Figure 2: Growth Rate and Shares of Investment and Consumption for Japan 
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Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
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Figure 3: Growth Rate and Shares of Investment and Consumption for South Korea 
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Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
 
In the case of South Korea, in the mid-1960s, owing to its labor-intensive export-led growth model, its 
real GDP (per capita) has grown rapidly (Figure 3). The investment share of GDP soared quickly, from 
9.8 percent in 1960 to 24.4 percent in 1970, to 43.5 percent in 1979; and even reached 51.5 percent in 
1991 and 1994. Meanwhile, the consumption share has fallen continuously ---- 70.6 percent in 1960, 
down to 60.9 percent in 1975, arrived at 49.6 percent in 1988. As the growth rate of South Korean’s real 
per capita GDP turned to going down after the Asian financial crisis, the investment share of GDP 
significantly decreased to 44.6 percent in 2000, and 41.44 percent in 2007. As to the consumption share of 
GDP, it was 47.9 percent in 1998, and declined to 45.4 percent in 2007. 
As a result of the labor-intensive export-led growth model, the economies of Japan and South Korea 
were characterized by high investment, high export and low consumption during the period of their high 
growth. However, the downward trend of their consumption share was altered and remained at a certain 
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level, while still low, as their high GDP growth increased their per capita income.  
Although the Japanese and South Korean governments attempted to switch their growth model away 
from reliance on export to rely on their domestic consumption as a driven force of growth after the attack 
of the Asian Financial Crisis, they failed to largely increase the consumption shares in their economies. 
Without robust domestic consumption demand, the economies of Japan and South Korea have to continue 
to depend on the world market. 
Such a large economy like China, its economic growth should not be driven by the external demand in 
the long run. The demand for investment cannot be expanded sustainably without the stable growth of 
demand for final consumption, especially demand from household consumption. Hence, for China, how to 
change its growth model and to boost its domestic private consumption by the improvement of household 
income is particularly crucial to make its economic growth sustainable and achieve its ultimate goal of 
economic and social development. 
 
3.  Economic Structural Imbalance from the Production Perspective 
Social reproduction is an interrelated and interacting cyclical process. At the various stages of social 
reproduction, production determines distribution, circulation and consumption. The opposition is true. So, 
the reason for the expenditure structural unbalance should be traced out from the stage of production chain 
in social reproduction. 
Although the “Two High and One Low” expenditure uneven structure may be the common feature of 
labor-intensive export-led economies, when it comes to China, we can still find some features different 
from the market economies. In the current China’s economic institution, the need for high growth rate and 
fiscal revenue maximization forces local governments to compete against each other to get FDI by 
undervaluing production factors, contributing to the extensive pattern of growth. It’s the institutional 
reason why China can not abandon its extensive pattern of growth and transfer to the intensive pattern of 
growth. As a result, the extensive pattern of growth is closely related to the expenditure structural 
unbalance which is characterized by low consumption and high investment. Ultimately, the economic 
growth will go against its final development goal, and social reproduction will not be able to continue. 
We begin with the definition of the extensive pattern of growth and the intensive pattern of growth. In 
Dictionary of Political Economy (Xu, 1981), an extensive production is a mode of production with certain 
amount of means of production and labor associated with large amount of land, and simple work and 
managements are carried out. In the extensive operation, advanced means of production such as 
machinery and equipment and so on are not applied widely or not applied at all, neither is agricultural 
scientific technology. The key production factors are labor and land. It depends mainly on the expansion 
of cultivated land areas to increase crop yield. As to the intensive operation, it indicates the operation that 
large amount of means of production and labor are input to certain amount of land, and comprehensive 
work and managements are carried out with new technologies and equipments applied. By extension of 
the above definitions, the definitions of extensive pattern of growth and intensive pattern of growth can be 
given: the extensive pattern of growth is a pattern of growth that depends mainly on increasing the input 
of labor, land and natural resource, with less increase of capital and technology input; the intensive pattern 
of growth is a pattern of growth that depends mainly on raising labor productivity, land utilization rate and 
natural resource utilization rate to fulfill expended reproduction, with less increase of the input of labor, 
land and natural resource, and much increase of the input of capital and technology. 
For a long time, extensive pattern and intensive pattern of growth are valued differently, with the 
former depreciated and the latter praised in general. In fact, different patterns of growth formed under the 
different circumstances. The need for the maximization of their interests, people will rationally choose 
different pattern of growth with different constraint of resource. Hence, the two patterns of growth both 
have their reason to exist. The problem is which pattern of growth to choose under a given time-space 
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condition, so as to adjust to the given resource constraint, to optimize the allocation of resources and get 
the maximum revenue. 
At the beginning of China’s reform and opening-up, the coastal areas to a large extent relied on FDI, 
processing trade and OEM production to achieve rapid growth. In 1978, China’s per capita GDP was 381 
Yuan at the prices of 1978. With a low saving rate and a shortage of capital, but abundance of land and 
labor, as well as a low cost of non-renewable resources such as environment and so on, the extensive 
pattern of growth was a rational choice for the coastal areas to develop economies given the stage of 
development. Nonetheless, this export-led growth by getting FDI, processing labor-intensive products 
obviously, which extensively utilizes domestic production factors such as land, labor and natural 
resources, was unlikely the intensive pattern of growth. Moreover, FDI inflow into China mainly went to 
labor-intensive, export-oriented, and processing manufacturing. Taking advantage of cheap labor and land, 
foreign-invested enterprises have succeeded in raising their market shares. For China, that was the rational 
choice for its early development and economic catch-up, thereby the best way of reallocating the labor 
force from agriculture sectors in the rural areas to manufacture sectors in the urban areas; consequently, 
China could speed up its economic growth and increase its national income for the past three decades. 
As a result of economic growth, an increase in labor cost as well as other costs of production factors 
will be inevitable, correspondingly compelling the pattern of growth to switch to the intensive pattern 
away from the original extensive pattern. In this process, increased per capita income would facilitate the 
investment in human capital, which will definitely result in a rise of absolute price and relative price of 
labor.  
For the production factor such as land, environment and natural resources, they can basically be viewed 
as given-amount factors because of its non-renewable nature. In the process of economic development, 
land will become rare and expensive. However, the production factors such as capital and technology are 
different from labor, land, environment and natural resources. Economic growth brings an increase in 
saving rate and investment rate, so alleviates the scarcity of capital, driving down the price and marginal 
return of capital. Changes in  relative prices among production factors as a result of economic growth will 
force firms  to replace labor and land with capital, adopt new technology, enforce management, then 
depend mainly on increasing labor productivity, land utilization rate and natural utilization rate to fulfill 
extended reproduction and economic growth. In other words, economic growth model will change from 
extensive pattern to intensive pattern spontaneously because of the change of relative prices of factors 
under the action of normal market mechanism. 
The trajectory of changes in growth model can be observed in cases of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
(China). Figure 4 displays the level of real GDP per worker at the constant prices and based on PPP US 
dollar for these three countries and areas in 2005. 
 
Figure 4: Time Series of Real GDP per worker for Certain Economies 
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Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
 
From 1960 to 1990, the Japanese real GDP per worker had increased rapidly to $51088 in 1990, 4.5 
times the amount in 1960.The soaring of the South Korean and Taiwanese real GDP per worker began in 
the 1970s, South Korean real GDP per worker in 2000 was 4 times more than the amount in 1970; 
Taiwanese real GDP per worker in 2000 was 5.5 times more than the amount in 1970. In the 21st century, 
the growth of real GDP per worker in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (China) slowed down, their real 
GDP per worker in 2007 were 1.1 times, 1.2 times and 1.18 times more than the amount in 2000 
respectively. In the presence of collective wage bargaining system, real GDP per worker is the key 
determinant of the price of labor power. Hence, these economies enjoyed a rapid rise of wage when they 
experienced high growth. The simultaneous increase in wages set the stage for quick accumulation of 
human capital in these economies on one hand, forced capital owners to substitute capital and technology 
for labor due to increased labor cost on the other hand. Thus, industrial structure was upgraded, and trade 
surplus was turned to capital export (FDI), gradually the growth model was reformed from the extensive 
pattern to the intensive pattern. 
It is difficult to understand that the reform of growth model in China is relatively slow, though Chinese 
economy has grown at the rate of near 10 percent over the recent decade, and per capita GDP in 2008 was 
10 times more than the amount in 1978. The growth accounting for the Chinese economy has shown that 
the contribution of TFP is small, which means that China’s growth model is still the extensive pattern and 
with the accumulation of physical capital and labor input as the main driven forces (Economic Growth 
Frontier Subject Team, Institute of Economics, CASS, 2005; Guo, and Jia, 2005; Lin et al., 2003). With 
this growth model, per capital income cannot catch up proportionally with the rapid growth of GDP (Li, 
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2007). As a result, domestic consumption especially household consumption is weak. A large amount of 
production capacity formulated by investments fails to find demand domestically. In the end, the export-
led growth model is formed (Gong and Li, 2006). The investment-driven and export-led extensive pattern 
of growth failed to be reformed, to some degree this growth model has been even strengthened during the 
last decade, gradually resulting in the expenditure structure unbalance with high investment, high export 
and low consumption (Gong and Li, 2009). 
Why did China’s high growth fail to cause the shift of growth model from the extensive pattern to the 
intensive pattern? Or why is the change quite slow? The stagnancy of adjustments of relative prices of 
production factors is the most important reason. The price mechanism is the primary channel for recourse 
allocation in market economy. Because of the distorted relative prices of resources in China, it’s 
impossible to require economic subjects to optimize the usage of resources according to the real social 
costs of resources. After many years of rapid growth, the reason---- why did China’s growth model fail to 
be changed in time, or why is the extensive pattern of growth still the rational choice for entrepreneur, lies 
in a proper deduction that although per capita GDP has been increased dramatically, the relative prices of 
labor, land, natural resources and environment to capital are barely changed, compared to twenty years 
ago. 
But, if growth is real, the relative scarcity of capital, labor, land, natural resources and environment 
impossibly remains the same. So, the possibility is that the relative scarcity has changed, but the prices of 
labor, land, natural resources and environment relative to capital remain the same. Then, what formulates 
and maintains the distortion of relative prices of factors? 
Governments’ productive decision has been a crucial contributor in leading production factors not to be 
priced correctly in a transition economy. The price distortion unlikely happens in the market economy 
with competitive equilibrium. However, it likely happens in the government-dominant market economy if 
disequilibrium has occurred in the balance of various powers that affecting market. Because the economy 
is government-dominant, although the social powers to push the disequilibrium may be more than one, the 
government must be the only one possible power to fulfill the disequilibrium. Why does the government 
contain the original relative prices of labor, land, natural resources and environment to capital under the 
circumstance of changed relative scarcity of factors? 
Goals determine behaviors. There are much description and analysis of ideal model of government 
behaviors and objectives in textbooks. But, in the real world, it is a disputable issue that the government 
especially local governments have put high attention to the local economic growth and the concomitant 
growth of fiscal revenue. The competition among local governments for local economic growth and fiscal 
revenue maximization forces them to contain the original relative prices of labor, land, natural resources 
and environment to capital in their administrating areas as far as possible under the circumstance of 
changed relative scarcity of factors. 
To pursuit economic growth, the local governments must make every effort to expand investment. 
Historically, economic development proves that without major technological breakthrough, contribution 
on economic growth of the improvement in efficiency of resource utilization is quite limited. Even in the 
developed countries with higher technological innovation ability, the contribution of the annual 
improvement in the labor productivity to economic growth is very limited in the absolute terms, usually 
no more than one percentage point(Jorgenson, 2001). Without large increase in the efficiency of resource 
utilization, economic growth has to depend on increasing inputs. At the beginning of economic 
development, low per capita GDP and low saving rate mainly resulted in the shortage of capital. At a 
certain stage of economic development, the reason for capital shortage may no longer be low saving rate, 
but the fact that savings cannot be transformed to investments. Given that the physical capital input plays 
a decisive role in the economic growth, the local governments have been trying to finance investment with 
FDI inflow. Pursuing the maximization of economic growth rate, the local governments compete against 
each other for attracting FDI, which inevitably depressing the prices of the production factors. If the 
quality and the efficiency of factors such as land and labor are unchanged, the lower prices of these 
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factors are, the higher return rate of the capital will be ensured.  
Though it is successful for promoting economic growth, lowering the price of domestic production 
factor to attractive foreign investment also comes some cost. First, compared with the reform of the final 
product market, the reform of factor market lags behind. Second, the artificially distorted factors price 
ratio maintains the extensive pattern of economic growth, which causes a great loss to the resource 
allocation efficiency. On one hand, the return for the capital is high while the return for the labor and land 
is low; on the other hand, the return for domestic factors (labor, land, interest rates and the environment) 
is low while the return for foreign factors is high. During the period of 1990-2005, the ratio of the 
business turnover to GDP increased from 21.9 percent to 29.6 percent, while the ratio of the labor income 
to GDP decreased by 12 percentiii
 
. In 1999, the labor share accounted for 49.1 percent in GNP, and once 
increased to 50.3 percent in 2002(Figure 5). As the Chinese economy rapidly developed, however the 
labor share in GNP declined. The number is only 45.3 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, with enlarged the gap 
of income distribution, tense relationship among the various interest groups is getting worse. Third, the 
growth rate of domestic residents’ income especially labor income is often lower than the growth rate of 
GDP, which causes insufficient consumption. To achieve high economic growth, we had to rely on 
investment and export. As time goes by, the national income distribution becomes more uneven. Fourth, 
as it doesn’t bring the synchronization increase for the residents’ income, the economic growth is 
becoming the means for achieving the policy goals and increasing the fiscal revenue. That weakens the 
relationship between the growth and improvement of the welfare for the residents. So it is more and more 
difficult to explain the ultimate meaning of economic growth, and it tends to be the opposite side of the 
original meaning of growth. 
Figure 5: China’s Labor Share 
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Source: Bai and Qiang (2009) 
 
4. Economic Structural Unbalance and Uneven Income Distribution 
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The expenditure structural unbalance is also the result of uneven national income distribution. Since 
the reform and opening-up, China’s national income distribution has experienced two major changes. 
Before the mid-1990s, the change trend of China’s national income distribution was as follows: the ratio 
of the fiscal income to GDP gradually declined while the ratio of residents’ income to the GDP gradually 
increased. In 1994, the former decreased from 31.6 percent to 10.9 percent while the latter increased from 
50.5 percent to 69.6 percent. This change laid a foundation of national income distribution for the 
transition from planned economy to market economy (Wang, 1995). After1994, the opposite change 
happened. During the period of 1996-2008, the curve of national government revenue in GDP was “U- 
type” (Figure 6). The number was 10.6 percent in 1996 and 20.3 percent in 2008, increasing by nearly 10 
percentage points, which means an increase of 100 percent. 
 
Figure 6: Share of National Government Revenue in China’s GDP 
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Source: The Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
The growth rate of fiscal revenue has exceeded the growth rate of GDP for many years, but the growth 
rate of urban-rural income has been lower than GDP growth rate. If we let the year of 1978 be the base 
year, in 1996 the index for GDP per capita and disposable income of urban households and rural 
households were 434, 302 and 418 respectively. In 2008, the index was 1100, 752 and 734, respectively. 
So per capita income index is lagging behind per capita GDP index. 
Meanwhile, the household saving rate was rising (Figure 7). In 1990ˈurban resident saving rate was 
only 15.3 percent, began rising rapidly after 2000 and was up to 28.8 percent in 2008. And the saving rate 
of rural residents also showed an upward trend.  
 
Figure 7: Household Saving Rate  
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Source: The Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
In the national income distribution structure, the offsetting relation between resident income and fiscal 
revenue was closely related to a number of institutional arrangements in this period. 
First, the ratio of tax to resident income increased gradually. According to the survey data of more than 
40,000 urban households, before 2001, the ratio of urban household disposable income per capita to per 
capita income was nearly 100 percent. Then the ratio fell rapidly, and in 2008, it was only 92.5 percent. 
This means tax-burden for the urban household was on the rise. 
Second, it’s the adjustment of the central and local fiscal revenue and expenditure structure. The 
reform of tax system in 1994 has significantly changed the share of central fiscal revenue and the local 
(Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Central Government Revenue and Local Governments Revenue 
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Source: The Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
Within one year, the fiscal revenue share for the central government jumped from 22.92 percent to 
55.70 percent, while the number for local governments fell rapidly from 77.98 percent to 44.30. The local 
government was compelled to explore new sources of revenue. Over the same period, driven by 
industrialization, urbanization causes a sharp appreciation of the land around the city. Therefore, the local 
governments find the new source of revenue. To a certain extent, huge land lease revenue makes up for 
the sharp reduction in revenue for the local government due to tax system reform. In 2007ˈthe ratio of 
national land-transferring revenue to the fiscal revenue was as high as 25.3 percent. In some places, 
income from land-transferring even exceeded the local fiscal revenue. At the same time, house price rose 
rapidly in the city. Due to commercialization of housing, the urban residents bear most of the cost in the 
rocking-up house price. This indirect tax changes the real distribution share between residents and the 
governments. To some degree, that inhibits the normal consumption desire of the residents. 
Third, the share of investment in education and health, social security and social welfare in the 
government investment is declining. Insufficient supply of these public goods not only slows down the 
pace of human capital accumulation and upgrading of industrial structure, but also strengthens the 
precautionary saving of the urban and rural residents, which inhibits the residents’ consumption demand. 
Recently, although the expansionary fiscal policy was implemented, it’s not very effective in changing 
that trend. 
To sum up, we can conclude that the national income “Two High and One Low” structural imbalance 
is closely related to the long-term unchanged labor-intensive export-led extensive economic growth 
pattern. In other words, the extensive pattern of growth formed by encouraging labor-intensive export is 
the production reason for the expenditure structural unbalance. And the national income distribution 
biased to the capital factors and the government is the distributional reason for the “two-high and one-
low” structural contradiction (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: “Two High and One Low” Expenditure Structure in China 
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Source: by authors. 
5. Conclusions 
The extensive pattern of growth with labor-intensive oriented export failed to be changed in time, 
inducing “Two High and One Low” expenditure structural unbalance, which is actually the result of 
national income distribution structural unbalance. Over the past decade, the significant changes of China’s 
income distribution structure are as follows: (1) the ratio of fiscal revenue to the GDP is rising rapidly; (2) 
the central government share in the fiscal revenue is rising rapidly; (3) the ratio of corporate business 
balance to the GDP is rising rapidly, whereas the ratio of labor income to the GDP is falling rapidly; (4) 
the income disparity among different groups is widening. 
The structural imbalance with national income distribution is the product of certain social-economic 
condition. It reflects power imbalance among different social class or interest groups---the government 
and the public, the central government and the local government, the capital owners and the labor force, 
different social classes---in determining the distribution of national income. And any particular social-
economic subject cannot be criticized for the formation of power imbalance. Being rational, different 
players in the market economy seek to maximize their own interests, which is understandable. The 
problem is that any social interest group plays in a certain framework of social-economic system: division 
of labor, cooperation, competition and confrontation. The effort to maximize the interests must be limited 
to certain system framework, constrained by power of the relevant stokeholds. And it leads to a proper 
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distribution structure of the national income, which does favor to the social reproduction. Otherwise, a 
severe structural imbalance of the income distribution will arise, market equilibrium probably cannot be 
realized, and the social reproduction is unable to proceed normally. 
Therefore, taking opening-up policy, we have achieved rapid economic growth through extensive 
pattern of labor-intensive export-led growth model. But the social-economic development needs to transit 
from the extensive growth to the intensive growth, “Two High and One Low” expenditure structural 
imbalance needs to be reversed, and the national income distribution structural imbalance also needs to be 
adjusted. To achieve that, we have to seek both explanations and solutions from the distribution relations 
among different interest groups and from the system framework. 
Of course, since the former is quite difficult, someone may ask the following question: in the 
framework of existing institutional structure, can’t the economic growth spontaneously transit from labor-
intensive export-led extensive pattern to intensive pattern? No, it can’t. Because the extensive patter of 
economic growth was determined by the growth target within the existing institutional framework. And 
this growth target decides the social cohesive force of distorting the relative prices of the factors. When 
prices of the domestic factors, including labor, land and environment, are undervalued, there is no reason 
to substitute capital and technology for the “cheap” factors of labor, land and environment though in fact 
these factors price is not cheap as far as the real social cost is concerned. When the export of labor-
intensive products is profitable, is there any incentive for the enterprises to invest in technological 
innovation to achieve industrial upgrading? And in the case of the social production mostly in labor-
intensive pattern, even if the governments and individuals invest heavily in human capital, forming 
complex labor force, it is very hard to find its social needs. Obviously, within the existing interest pattern, 
the trend of structural imbalance of the national income distribution is quite difficult to be reversed. 
Or ask whether structural imbalance of national expenditure caused by the extensive pattern of labor-
intensive export-led growth is so serious that we can’t maintain the normal process of reproduction unless 
the structural imbalance is adjusted. 
We should pay great attention to the path of economic growth in Japan and South Korea in the last half 
century. The comparable data reveals that: to some extent, China’s expenditure structural imbalance is 
severer than Japan and South Korea (Figure 10 and Figure 11). 
 
Figure10: Growth Rate and Shares of Consumption and Investment in China’s GDP 
 
52   Li Wenpu and Gong Min /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  37 – 54 
-20
-10
0
10
20
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
growth rate of China's per capita real GDP
share of consumption in China's GDP
share of investment in China's GDP
%
%
 
Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
 
Figure11: Consumption Rate for Certain Economies 
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Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
 
After the financial crisis, can China sustain that extensive pattern of labor-intensive export-led growth? 
The answer is subject to the international economic environment after the financial crisis. The financial 
crisis was caused by “high debts and low saving” structural imbalance of developed countries, led by the 
U.S. Before the subprime crisis, American consumption share was 70 percent high while the saving rate is 
almost zero. In 2006, the saving rate was minus 1 percent, setting the lowest record since 1993. The 
phenomenon that saving rate is too low while the consumption rate is too high also reflects in the huge 
trade deficit and the deficit in the current account. The scale of deficit in the current account has enlarged 
since 1991, and rose sharply after 2001, and was as high as 800 billion U.S. dollars in 2006, accounting 
for 7 percents in GDP (Wu and Liu, 2009). However, in August 2008, American personal saving rate 
began to rebound, and reached 6.9 percent in May 2009, setting a record since December 1993. If this 
change in the pattern of saving-consumption is not a temporary adjustment, we can’t neglect the effect of 
this change on China’s macro economy (CQMM, 2009). And even if no change in the international 
economic environment happens and we can continue the costly extensive pattern of economic growth 
departing from increasing the national income and improving the welfare, how can we get to prove the 
value and rationality of this growth from the goal of social development? 
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